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Abstract: - Significant research has been done in the area of Role Based Access Control [RBAC]. Within this 
research there has been a thread of work focusing on adding parameters to the role and permissions within 
RBAC. The primary benefit of parameter support in RBAC comes in the form of a significant increase in 
specificity in how permissions may be granted. This paper focuses on implementing a parameterized 
implementation based heavily upon existing standards. 
 
Key-Words: - Access Control Models, Security, Role Based Access Control 
 
1   Introduction 
The benefits inherent in role based access control 
and its derived access control models make this 
paradigm very well suited for use in web-based 
applications. As such, this work sets out to create an 
extensible access control service for web services. 
There are several standards and a body of existing 
research in this vein, and this work will seek to build 
upon prior successes as much as possible, while 
extending the body of work as necessary. 
 
There are many benefits inherent in having a 
flexible access control model that is capable of 
integrating different factors, for example, contextual 
information, into its access control policies. The 
addition of parameter support on top of the role 
based access control paradigm is an effective means 
of reaching this goal. Previous work has shown the 
benefit of utilizing contextual information as well as 
the overall benefits derived from parameterized 
RBAC.  An access control service that uses 
parameterized role based access control to 
implement flexibility and extensibility in its policy 
engine will have a variety of applications. The use 
of parameterized roles allows a greater degree of 
specificity in terms of the access granted to a 
specific role. This will reduce the overall amount of 
roles, by allowing roles to grant different degrees of 
access based upon their parameterized input. 
 
 
2   Background Information 
The problem posed by this paper is the creation and 
implementation of an extensible access control 
service. To solve this problem, we look at the 
existing body of work and find Service-Oriented 
Role Based Access Control [SRBAC], a model 
derived from RBAC with the intention of providing 
access control for web services. Extensible Access 
Control Markup Language [XACML] is a critical 
standard for expressing access control policies, 
requests, and responses. XACML provides an 
excellent means of expressing RBAC policies in an 
interchangeable format. 
 
This paper will investigate the feasibility of 
implementing an access control service based upon a 
variety of existing technologies that is reasonably 
flexible and extensible. The primary focus of the 
work is upon the margining of SRBAC and 
XACML. The benefit of having an RBAC approach 
to Service Oriented Access Control is work will be 
capable of synchronizing access control policy 
among a variety of related federated information 
sources.  Utilizing XACML to implement SRBAC 
ensures that it will be adaptable to a variety of 
computing environments 
 
Several researchers have explored bringing the 
functionality of Role Based Access Control to Web 
Services. Their work has taken many forms and has 
had differing approaches. In [18], Liu and Chen 
craft a model, based upon extensions to RBAC, 
called Web Services Role Based Access Control 
[WS-RBAC]. This work extends RBAC in taking 
into account the Business Process as a context to 
how a user attempts to access an object. Services are 
treated as objects, and access is largely governed via 
Business Processes, which serve as policies, marked 
up in Business Process Execution Language for Web 
Services [BPEL4WS]. BPEL4WS is a XML based 
markup language that is utilized for adding support 
for business related web services interaction [19]. 
Murty and Taylor in [20] devised a framework for 
controlling access to web resources utilizing Role 
Based Access Control and an XML format for 
passing access control information. Their work is 
primarily focused on distributing the responsibility 
for managing the access control database. Their 
work is now somewhat dated due to the fact that 
subsequent XML standards, such as XACML have 
arisen, yet their work takes a still-relevant approach 
to managing access control information, such as 
users, objects, etc. 
 
2.1 Role Based Access Control 
Role-Based Access Control is a flexible access 
control model, primarily notable for its addition of 
the notion of roles into access control. Ferriaolo and 
Kuhn have said that RBAC is a Mandatory Access 
Control [MAC] model, but that it diverges from 
MAC in several ways [3]. Many models have been 
derived from RBAC to solve a variety of access 
control related issues. Role Based Access Control 
has evolved significantly over the past decade, 
gaining acceptance. The notion of roles in RBAC 
provides significant benefit to managing access 
control in enterprise environments. RBAC allows 
the management of privileges by roles instead of 
subjects and supports the principle of least privilege 
and separation of duties [11]. 
 
A significant benefit to the underlying paradigm of 
RBAC is its adaptability to various computing 
configurations and constraints used to determine 
access control decisions. Researchers have adapted 
RBAC for geo-spatial applications, for ubiquitous 
computing applications, as well as extending aspects 
of the model to support features such as cascading 
delegation, negative permissions, and a variety of 
others that make the model more flexible and/or 
easier to manage in an actual implementation. As the 
uses for computing and data increase in diversity, 
access control models have been adapted, 
significantly increasing in complexity. This is 
particularly true in pervasive computing and 
distributed computing applications. Because of the 
nature of these computing applications, many 
assumptions used in crafting an access control 
model must be reconsidered. A significant part of 
the added complexity comes in the form of 
considering other factors. In the case of this work, 
the goal is to find a suitable extension of RBAC that 
is adaptable to the constraints involved in web 
services, while adding the benefits derived from a 
parameter based approach to specifying roles. 
 
2.2 Parameterization 
In [2], parameterization is adding descriptive 
information to roles and privileges to allow greater 
flexibility. In terms of privileges, [2] describes 
parameterized privileges as 2-tuples, where the first 
parameter represents the object to be accessed and 
the second parameter represents the access mode for 
that object given the privilege. With an object 
customerData, and permissions read, write, and null, 
example privileges would look like: 
 
• Priv1 = (customerData, read)  
• Priv2 = (customerData, write)  
• Priv3 = (customerData, null) 
 
Thus, privileges are of the form Privn = (o, pn), 
where p is a set of privileges for an object o. 
Parameterization also affects the subject portion of 
the RBAC equation. In [2], the authors describe 
roles with the notation (rname, rpset, rparamset) 
where rparamset is the set of role parameters for a 
given role with the name rname. The rparamset can 
be a null value if the role has no given parameters. 
An example role customerDataService that has an 
identifying attribute className with possible values 
updateCustData, readCustData and, eraseCustData 
could be represented as: 
 
• (customerDataService, className, 
updateCustData) 
• (customerDataService, className, 
readCustData) 
• (customerDataService, className, 
eraseCustData) 
 
In [2], it is notable that PA, the privilege to role 
assignment, is represented using XML XPath 
notation.  Because of this, a privilege to role 
assignment example incorporating the above-
explained notation could be represented as: 
 
• pa1 = (//customerDataService[@className = 
updateCustData]/customerDataService,update) 
• pa2 = (//customerDataService[@className = 
updateCustData]/customerDataService,read) 
• pa3 = (//customerDataService[@className = 
updateCustData]/customerDataService,erase)  
 
For this work, since it will be using XACML, the 
approach will differ. XACML links PolicySets using 
the <PolicySetIdReference> tag. In XACML 1.x, 
RBAC is implemented using linked PolicySets in 
this manner. Allowing for parameterization will 
simply require more complicated links between 
PolicySets. This is represented by examples in the 
Fig. 1 and Fig. 2.  
 
<PolicySet xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:policy"
    PolicySetId="RPS:student:role:studentid-02123781"
    PolicyCombiningAlgId=
    "urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:policy-combining-algorithm:permit-overrides">
  <Target>
    <Subjects>
      <Subject>
        <SubjectMatch MatchId=
          "urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:anyURI-equal">
          <AttributeValue DataType=
                      "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#anyURI">
       urn:example:role-values:student:rparams:studentid-02123781
      </AttributeValue>
          <SubjectAttributeDesignator
              AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:role"
              DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#anyURI"/>         
        </SubjectMatch>
        <SubjectMatch MatchId=
"urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
          <AttributeValue
              DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
studentid-02123781
</AttributeValue>
          <SubjectAttributeDesignator
              AttributeId="RParams"
              DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/>
        </SubjectMatch>
      </Subject>
    </Subjects>
  </Target>
  <PolicySetIdReference>PPS:student:role:studentid-02123781
</PolicySetIdReference> 
</PolicySet>
Fig. 1 XACML Representation of Parameterized 
Roles 
 
Fig. 2 XACML Representation of a Parameterized 
Privilege Instance 
 
2.3 Service Oriented RBAC 
Service Oriented Role Based Access Control is a 
derivative of Role Based Access Control that is 
designed to account for basic RBAC unsuitability 
[5] as an access control model for a web services 
framework. A notable aspect of SRBAC is the 
presence of a function mapping for actors to single 
users. In SRBAC, the actor object is designed as a 
role activation proxy for a user’s roles [5]. Also of 
note is the many-to-many service relation SR [5]. In 
SRBAC, services replace the object construct found 
in standard RBAC. Thus, the SR relation replaces 
the object relation found in RBAC. SRBAC is a 
simple and elegant solution to the modification of 
RBAC to facilitate controlling access in a service- 
oriented environment, such as that of web services. 
 
2.3.1 Reasons for adding parameterization to 
SRBAC  
Ge and Osborn’s motivation for role 
parameterization comes into play for XML 
documents where a greater degree of specificity in 
determining which data is accessible to specific 
users, or user roles, than is possible with standard 
RBAC. In terms of web services, the same model 
may apply, as these services provide federated 
access to data sources and applications that may 
need to be constrained in a manner similar to the 
XML data sets that Ge and Osborn discuss. This 
work will focus on providing an integrated access 
control framework for controlling access to multiple 
related web services. 
 
An example environment where an integrated access 
control framework with the flexibility provided by 
parameterized roles would be usable is a federated 
data source, such as a service that provides a 
dynamic XML or RSS feed of a news source. 
Parameterized roles could be used as a means to 
customize the content of such a data source based 
upon client attributes. Such work has the potential 
for the incorporation of such contextual information 
as the geographic location of the client or type of 
client, i.e. provide one set of content to an end user 
with a feed-reader versus a different content set to a 
partnering website based upon the user agent 
environment variable, which would be passed as a 
role parameter. Implementing an integrated role 
based access control system with parameterized 
roles could be beneficial in tightly filtering visible 
information to that absolutely required to be 
returned to the end user, based upon their needs as 
determined by their role within the framework. 
 
2.3.2 Implementing SRBAC with XACML  
The benefit of adding parameterized roles and 
privileges to SRBAC would come in the way Actors 
are activated. In Ge and Osborn’s [2] paper, they use 
the construct of Actors as special proxy roles that 
are a part of Simple Object Access Protocol [SOAP] 
messages. Actors are activated for each role owned 
by a particular user. In this work, we chose not to 
use SOAP, thus adding parameter support to Roles 
will give us the same net effect, but in a way that 
can fit into the existing XACML format with 
minimal modification required. The Actor in 
SRBAC consists of <user, role, time, constraints>, 
it is possible for this work to represent this object 
using parameters. This could be done by creating 
dynamic roles with parameters represents a user 
identifying value, time, and any constraint or 
constraints required by a given system of services. 
 
In [5], the authors chose to utilize SOAP messages 
as the medium for sending access control requests 
and responses, making the proxy role Actor  
necessary. However, because this work has utilized 
XACML instead of SOAP, the Actor is not 
necessary. In order to be true to the model, this work 
describes two approaches, one utilizing the Actor, 
and another, which does not require it. Essentially, 
the Actor is a pseudo-role. Implementing such a 
pseudo role in XACML is does not seem to be 
directly supported, but is possible by utilizing 
multiple requests to generate the credentials 
necessary to grant the requested access.   
 
It is notable that, any implementation of the Actor as 
described in [5] will require specific application 
code to support the proxying of requests. For 
example, if a student wants to register for classes, 
and the system implements parameterized roles, the 
application code that approves the first request will 
activate the student’s role and generate a hash or 
checksum to validate the request. The application 
code will submit a second request using the user’s 
activated role as a parameter, that will activate the 
Actor, then the access to the object will be allowed. 
It is important that this second request have some 
verifying information, in our case a hash that is 
partially generated by some secret present on the 
server, to preserve the system’s integrity. 
 
Without the Actor, it is possible to submit the 
request without the secondary request. The second 
request does provide a degree of security to the 
system, in that the user has already been 
authenticated, and that the privilege is not directly 
associated with the user’s role. The rationale given 
in [5] for having the second request is largely based 
upon the reliance on SOAP, which is not a integral 
part of this work. The choice to utilize the Actor is 
largely a design decision based upon the 
implementation needs of the system, balancing 
additional security against the additional overhead 
of addition request/response traffic. For the purpose 
of this work, we will not utilize the Actor.  
 
2.4 Service Oriented RBAC  
Extensible Access Control Markup Language is a 
standard of the Organization for the Advancement of 
Structured Information standards [OASIS] as of 
2003. The standard is currently in its second revision 
as of February 2005. The goal of this standard is to 
provide a flexible, platform independent, 
environment independent means for specifying 
access control policy for XML content sharing. This 
open standard approach has been implemented by a 
variety of vendors, to include Sun Microsystems and 
the Java 2 Platform, as well as Microsoft’s .NET 
environment. The quick acceptance of the XACML 
standards by vendors greatly increases its viability 
as a means for specifying access control policies in 
the web services environment. 
 
2.4.1 Support for RBAC in XACML  
It is notable that as of the publication time of 
SRBAC, the XACML standard did not directly 
support the notion of roles, [5] which are essential in 
RBAC and RBAC derived access control models. In 
the meantime, support has been added for roles in 
the form of an XACML profile for role-based access 
control in 2004. This document is specifically 
designed to extend XACML such that it will fulfill 
the requirements necessary to support RBAC 
without changes to the 1.0 or 1.1 standard [7]. 
 
With the second release of the XACML 
specification, a new profile for role based access 
control has been specified. This profile includes the 
necessary support for roles, but also, importantly, 
specifically supports core RBAC, also called 
RBAC0 and hierarchical RBAC, also called RBAC1 
[8]. Within the context of this work, adding 
parameters to roles does not seem to violate any 
aspect of RBAC0 or RBAC1, although in the 
implementation, there may issues involved in 
formatting parameterized roles such that they will fit 
into the XACML implementation framework as 
described in this work.  
 
For the implementation phase of this project, the 
author chose Sun Microsystems’ XACML 
implementation. This is the only widely available 
open source implementation of XACML. Sun’s 
implementation is Java-based, which helps to make 
it the ideal choice for implementing a web-service or 
web service enabling library. Sun’s XACML code 
also requires an external XML parser, due to some 
limitations in the parser (Crimson) that it is included 
in Java 1.4.x. Among its limitations, the Crimson 
parser does not support XPath. 
 
2.4.2 Use of Parameterized Roles in XACML  
Working with XACML version 1, the notion of roles 
in RBAC is best handled in a way that this paper 
will describe as policy layering. In Policy Layering, 
One XACML policy is used to determine which 
subjects belong to a role. Other XACML policies 
can be linked, and through them, privileges can be 
derived.  
 
3   Problem Solution 
In this work, the problem consists of several parts 
that will be dealt with independently. First is the 
implementation of parameterized roles in within a 
framework that utilizes XACML. This was expected 
to be a potential problem because RBAC that 
supports parameterized roles was initially 
implemented using SOAP messages as a medium. 
This work is specifically focused on using XACML, 
as its medium, primarily to facilitate portability into 
environments beyond web services. The problem is, 
because this work itself does not use SOAP, it is to 
some degree, deviating from what the prior research 
has done.  
 
3.1 Integrating RBAC and Web Services 
XACML and Security Assertion Markup Language 
[SAML] have been established as standards for 
communicating access control requests and 
decisions. SAML handles authentication requests 
and responses, while XACML is a markup language 
for representing access policy [13]. This work will 
depend heavily on XACML. While some 
researchers utilize XACML [5], others have taken 
alternate approaches, in some cases using SOAP [6]. 
In this work, the policy based interactions, policy 
exchange and access requests and responses are 
handled in XACML, but in a web-services 
environment, these messages would likely be 
encapsulated in SOAP messages. It is notable that 
this differs from the approach in Ge and Osborn in 
[5. The difference is that the access control attributes 
in their work are passed as attributes of the actual 
SOAP message, versus encapsulating the access 
control request within the message. 
 
4. Conclusion  
This work accomplishes three research goals. First, 
it proves that XACML can be utilized to 
accommodate the notion of parameterized role based 
access control. Secondly, XACML can be used to 
accommodate Service Oriented Role Based Access 
Control, as described in [5] with minor modification. 
Finally, it shows how the benefits from 
parameterized roles and a service oriented version of 
role based access control can be combined to 
produce a very flexible access control paradigm for 
controlling access to federated sources, such as web 
services, without a requirement for modifying SOAP 
messages. An access control system such as that 
described in this paper could be implemented in a 
variety of forms, as a middleware component, as a 
module in an application, or as a server side 
component in a client-server application. Because of 
its protocol independence, a system could benefit 
from this access control system utilizing a variety of 
communication frameworks, peer-to-peer, client-
server, or otherwise. 
 
To test the basic feasibility of interpreting requests 
we first run some basic tests with the XACML 
Policy Decision Point. We first use basic XACML 
formatted policies and requests to establish for our 
purposes how the Sun XACML implementation 
handles access requests. A policy is then crafted that 
implements both parameterized roles and 
parameterized privileges attempting to access 
service related objects and run several tests that 
confirm that the Sun XACML implementation 
responds as expected. Our tests worked as expected 
and serve as a basis that can be built upon in 
establishing a comprehensive access control 
infrastructure that uses parameterized roles and 
parameters as a basis for a flexible access control 
policy implementation. 
 
4.1 Future Work 
There are a few avenues for further research. First, 
the actual application of this work to different 
application environments, for example, web 
services, peer-to-peer environments, as well in 
hybrid configurations would be well served by 
further treatment. Secondly, building an access 
control mechanism based upon the work in this 
paper and incorporating the means to provide 
enterprise subject, role, service, and object 
management facilities is an obvious direction for 
follow-on work. Also, much of the work described 
in this paper, coupled with an as yet specified 
infrastructure could be applied to an enterprise 
digital rights management, studying the problems 
inherent in such an approach would be a possible 
area of study. Another potential area for work would 
be in devising a new RBAC model that keeps the 
benefits of parameterization of roles, yet is designed 
specifically with the requirements of being able to 
operate in a variety of distributed systems 
environments. 
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